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The Complexity of Coherence: 
Justice LeBel’s Administrative Law 
Lorne Sossin* 
Canadians will deal with administrative action and justice more  
often than with the civil or criminal courts in their daily life. 
— Justice Louis LeBel1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Blencoe,2 Justice LeBel’s first major administrative law judgment 
after joining the Supreme Court, he memorably quipped, “[N]ot all 
administrative bodies are the same. Indeed, this is an understatement. At 
first glance, labour boards, police commissions and milk control boards 
may seem to have about as much in common as assembly lines, cops, 
and cows!” It was clear a fresh voice had arrived — and at a moment of 
significant upheaval and flux for Administrative Law. But few predicted 
just how significantly Justice LeBel would transform key aspects of  
the field. 
In the 20 or so significant administrative law judgments that 
followed Blencoe, Justice LeBel carved out a distinctive approach to 
Administrative Law, one characterized by the search for analytic 
coherence in a field, as he noted above, defined by its diversity. While far 
more space would be needed to fully engage with Justice LeBel’s many 
                                                                                                                                   
* Dean and Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I am grateful to Davina 
Finn, J.D./M.B.A. ’16 for her helpful research assistance for this article. I am also indebted to Jula 
Hughes for her invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this article as well as the organizers and 
participants of the Workshop on the Legacy of Louis LeBel held at the University of Toronto on 
October 17, 2014. 
1 Speech given by Justice LeBel to CLEBC Administrative Law Conference on October 26, 
2012, published in the Canadian Journal of Administrative Law & Practice (2013), at 51-66, online: 
<http://administrativejusticereform.ca/lebel-j-perhaps-stronger-constitutional-protection-for-
administrative-tribunals/>.  
2 Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000]  
2 S.C.R. 307, at para. 158 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Blencoe”]. 
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contributions to administrative law, the analysis that follows will focus 
on the standard of review doctrine, as it is hard to think of a field of law 
more affected by his tenure on the Court. 
Beginning with concurring judgments in Chamberlain3 and Toronto 
(City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.), Local 79,4 
Justice LeBel took issue with the prevailing approach to the standard of 
review (both its methodology and application). His concern was not only 
the lack of coherence in the field as it had then been developed, but he 
also worried, relatedly, about the predictability and workability of the 
analytic framework whose creation was primarily the responsibility of 
the Supreme Court. More than just the important content, Justice LeBel 
also brought a distinctive analytic authenticity to his signature administrative 
law judgments. His judgments during this period were more inquisitive than 
authoritative, reflecting his intellectual curiosity and search for clarity. 
Justice LeBel finally had the opportunity to develop his own vision 
of the standard of review in Dunsmuir,5 the landmark administrative law 
judgment he authored jointly with Bastarache J. While the dust has yet to 
settle on what has come to be known as the Dunsmuir Framework, 
Justice LeBel’s pursuit of simplicity, transparency and coherence has 
reinvigorated Canadian administrative law and clarified its practice for 
advocates, adjudicators and academics alike. At the same time, however, 
Justice LeBel may have achieved greater analytic clarity at the risk of 
glossing over the very contextual resonance he first articulated so 
colourfully in Blencoe. Put differently, the problem may not be with 
Justice LeBel’s vision, but with the lens itself, and whether the judicial 
process, with its inherent constraints of experience and evidence, can do 
justice to the lived realities of the administrative state. 
This article is divided into three sections and a conclusion. In the first 
section, I canvass Justice LeBel’s evolving vision of administrative law 
and his growing focus on the standard of review. In the second section,  
I focus on Dunsmuir and some of the subsequent cases which sought to 
refine (and amplify) the path which Dunsmuir charted. In the third section, 
I elaborate on the implications of Justice LeBel’s vision of Canadian 
administrative law and the inherent tension with that vision between 
                                                                                                                                   
3 Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, [2002] S.C.J. No. 87, 2002 SCC 86, at 
paras. 199-215 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chamberlain”]. 
4 [2003] S.C.J. No. 64, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, at paras. 60-135 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Toronto 
(City)”]. 
5 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, 2008 SCC 9 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Dunsmuir”]. 
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coherent judicial principle and diverse context and settings for 
administrative law practice in Canada. 
II. JUSTICE LEBEL’S EVOLVING VISION OF  
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW’S EVOLUTION 
It is often said that administrative law is the most interesting and 
important area of law precisely because it is about every other area of 
law too. At its broadest, any exercise of statutory or public power by any 
official in any context engages administrative law principles (e.g., labour, 
immigration, banking, social benefits, taxation, national security, etc.).  
This breadth presents certain complications when attempting to 
discuss the body of work of a Supreme Court Justice. For this reason,  
I have limited my discussion to a certain group of “core” administrative 
law cases where Justice LeBel authored or co-authored a substantively 
significant decision. I have no doubt such an analysis seriously 
underestimates his influence on the field — both through decisions to 
which he contributed through deliberations and comments on drafts but 
did not author, and through his various speeches and writings on 
administrative law, only a few examples of which are referenced in the 
discussion below.  
Before turning to Justice LeBel’s judgments, it is important to 
understand his enduring fascination (and, some would say, fixation) on 
the standard of review within administrative law. The standard of review 
addresses how and when courts may interfere with the actions of 
statutory decision-makers, whether through appeals set out in statutory 
schemes or through judicial review of administrative decision-making. 
As Justices LeBel and Bastarache note in Dunsmuir, the standard of 
review is first and foremost a key instantiation of the rule of law.6 The 
rule of law dictates that all government authority must have a source in 
law, and therefore that courts have an inherent jurisdiction to review all 
exercises of government authority to ensure the legal limits of that 
authority have not been exceeded.  
At the same time, the standard of review reflects democratic 
commitments, and the obligation of the courts to defer to the intent of the 
legislature to endow administrative decision-makers with legal authority,  
 
                                                                                                                                   
6 Id., at paras. 27-28. 
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and in some cases, broad discretion. Finally, the standard of review 
engages the changing realities of the administrative state, where courts 
have come increasingly to recognize the expertise of various policy, 
regulatory and discretionary bodies relative to the judicial role. 
While rooted in enduring principles, the standard of review doctrine 
has been dynamic rather than static — it is an evolving, multi-headed 
hydra precisely because of the virtually unbounded diversity of 
administrative decision-making. As Iacobucci J. observed, the complexity 
of the standard of review lies not in the conceptual framework of a 
spectrum of standards, but in its application to the myriad delegated 
powers of decision: “... The complexity was created not by the courts but 
by the legislators, who wisely decided that not all administrative agencies 
would operate in the same way. It is a complexity that the courts must 
attempt to deal with and it would be irresponsible simply for judges to 
wish it away.”7  
For example, the attempt at synthesis in cases such as Ryan,8 
involving the review of tribunals, had unravelled by the time of 
Dunsmuir, a mere five years later. Similarly, the apparent clarity around 
the standard of review for administrative discretion in Baker9 had to be 
revisited and clarified again as early as in Suresh.10 Justice LeBel not 
only witnessed these twists and turns, but acted as a key catalyst for 
rethinking the doctrine so as to create a more enduring framework. Early 
on, Justice LeBel seemed to realize that the path to progress would be 
one of creative destruction of the then-existing standard of review 
framework. 
In Chamberlain, for example, writing sole concurring reasons, 
Justice LeBel reviewed the then-governing “pragmatic and functional” 
methodology for determining which of the three standards of review then 
recognized would apply in a given decision-making context (patent 
unreasonableness was the most deferential standard, correctness was the 
least deferential and reasonableness simpliciter was a standard 
                                                                                                                                   
7 The Honourable Justice Iacobucci, “Articulating a Rational Standard of Review Doctrine: 
A Tribute to John Willis” (2002) 27 Queens L.J. 859-78, at 872 [hereinafter “Iacobucci, 
‘Articulating a Rational Standard”’]. 
8 Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] S.C.J. No. 17, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247 
(S.C.C.).  
9 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 
2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Baker”]. 
10 Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, 2002 
SCC 1 (S.C.C.). 
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somewhere in the middle of this spectrum of deference). Chamberlain 
involved the review of a school board decision involving elementary 
school curriculum materials and Justice LeBel questioned the usefulness 
of the pragmatic and functional approach in the context of policy 
decisions made by elected municipal councils. He observed: 
When the administrative body whose decision is challenged is not a 
tribunal, but an elected body with delegated power to make policy 
decisions, the primary function of judicial review is to determine 
whether that body acted within the bounds of the authority conferred on 
it. Courts must respect the responsibility of such bodies to serve those 
who elected them, and will, as a rule, interpret their statutory powers 
generously (see Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), 
[1994] 1 S.C.R. 231, at p. 244, per McLachlin J. (as she then was); 
Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 342, 2000 
SCC 13, at para. 36; 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Societe 
d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241, at para. 23). The 
decisions or actions of an administrative body of this kind will be 
invalidated if they are plainly contrary to the express or implied 
limitations on its powers. The mechanical application, in this context, 
of a test which was developed with a quite different kind of 
administrative body in mind is not only unnecessary, but may also lead 
both to practical difficulties and to uncertainties about the proper basis 
of judicial review.11  
Justice LeBel’s critique raised a more fundamental challenge to the 
direction the Supreme Court was bringing to Canadian administrative law, 
largely under the leadership of then Justice Iacobucci.12 That challenge 
was whether the same standard of review should apply for all manner of 
administrative decisions, from regulatory to adjudicative, policy to factual, 
immigration officer to Minister, regulatory to discretionary. As Justice 
LeBel put it, “... In certain circumstances, such as those at issue in 
Chamberlain itself, applying this methodological approach in order to 
                                                                                                                                   
11 Chamberlain, supra, note 3, at para. 191 (S.C.C.).  
12 For some contemporaneous reflections, see Iacobucci, “Articulating a Rational Standard”, 
supra, note 7; L. Sossin, “Empty Ritual, Mechanical Exercise or the Discipline of Deference?: 
Revisiting the Standard of Review in Administrative Law” (2003) 27 Advocates’ Q. 478; and  
D. Mullan, “Baker and Deference: Interpreting the Conflicting Signals” in D. Dyzenhaus, ed., The 
Unity of Public Law (London: Hart, 2003). For more background on Iacobucci J.’s contributions, see 
L. Sossin & C. Flood, “The Contextual Turn: Iacobucci’s Legacy and the Standard of Review in 
Administrative Law” (Special Issue, Spring 2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 581. 
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determine the appropriate standard of review may in fact obscure the real 
issue before the reviewing court.”13  
In Toronto (City), Justice LeBel (writing in a concurring judgment) 
acknowledged the “growing criticism” and “serious concerns” about the 
Court’s standard of review case law.14 That judgment reflects what  
I characterized above as Justice LeBel’s analytic authenticity.  
While the standard of review questions in the case at bar were 
uncontroversial (indeed, the Court was unanimous that a patently 
unreasonable standard applied and that it had been infringed by the 
arbitrator whose decision was impugned), and while the parties had not 
made submissions on the broader standard of review framework, 
Justice LeBel observed, that “The Court cannot remain unresponsive to 
sustained concerns or criticism coming from the legal community in 
relation to the state of Canadian jurisprudence in this important part of 
the law.”15 While the majority judgment (authored by Arbour J.) 
dispensed with the standard of review in four paragraphs,16 Justice LeBel 
devoted 75 paragraphs to his detailed examination of the issue.  
Justice LeBel responded to the concerns he identified in a reflective 
and comprehensive analysis which cast doubt on the entire structure of 
the Court’s standard of review jurisprudence.17 Justice LeBel described 
the distinction between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness 
simpliciter as “nebulous”,18 and characterized the relationship between 
                                                                                                                                   
13 Toronto (City), supra, note 4, at para. 61 (S.C.C.). 
14 Id., at para. 64. 
15 Id., at para. 64. 
16 Justice Arbour had the benefit of reviewing Justice LeBel’s reasons and offered the 
following comment:  
My colleague LeBel J. discusses at length our jurisprudence on standards of review.  
He reviews concerns and criticisms about the three standard system of judicial review. 
Given that these issues were not argued before us in this case, and without the benefit of a 
full adversarial debate, I would not wish to comment on the desirability of a departure 
from our recently affirmed framework for standards of review analysis. (See this Court’s 
unanimous decisions of Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British 
Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 2003 SCC 19, and Law Society of New Brunswick v. 
Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, 2003 SCC 20.).  
Id., at para. 12. 
17 For another example of this critique, see the judgment of Justice LeBel in Voice 
Construction Ltd. v. Construction & General Workers’ Union, Local 92, [2004] S.C.J. No. 2, 2004 
SCC 23, at paras. 39-42 (S.C.C.). 
18 Toronto (City), supra, note 4, at para. 65 (S.C.C.). On this point, after reviewing in-depth 
the attempts to distinguish the two types of reasonableness review, Justice LeBel: 
In the end, the essential question remains the same under both standards: was the decision 
of the adjudicator taken in accordance with reason? Where the answer is no, for instance 
because the legislation in question cannot rationally support the adjudicator’s interpretation, 
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patent unreasonableness and correctness as “blurred”. In one passage, he 
observed: 
At times the Court’s application of the standard of patent unreasonableness 
may leave it vulnerable to criticism that it may in fact be doing implicitly 
what it has rejected explicitly: intervening in decisions that are, in its view, 
incorrect, rather than limiting any intervention to those decisions that lack a 
rational foundation. In the process, what should be an indelible line 
between correctness, on the one hand, and patent unreasonableness, on the 
other, becomes blurred. It may very well be that review under any standard 
of reasonableness, given the nature of the intellectual process it involves, 
entails such a risk. Nevertheless, the existence of two standards of 
reasonableness appears to have magnified the underlying tension between 
the two standards of reasonableness and correctness.19  
While he could have left the discussion at this point, instead he pursued 
the point to its logical end. He added: 
There is no easy way out of this conundrum. Whatever attempts are made 
to clarify the contours of, or the relationship between, the existing 
definitional strands of patent unreasonableness, this standard and 
reasonableness simpliciter will continue to be rooted in a shared rationale: 
statutory language is often ambiguous and ‘admits of more than one 
possible meaning’; provided that the expert administrative adjudicator’s 
interpretation ‘does not move outside the bounds of reasonably permissible 
visions of the appropriate interpretation, there is no justification for court 
intervention’ (Mullan, ‘Recent Developments in Standard of Review’, 
supra, at p. 18). It will thus remain difficult to keep these standards 
conceptually distinct, and I query whether, in the end, the theoretical efforts 
necessary to do so are productive. Obviously any decision that fails the test 
of patent unreasonableness must also fall on a standard of reasonableness 
simpliciter, but it seems hard to imagine situations where the converse is 
not also true: if a decision is not supported by a tenable explanation and is 
thus unreasonable) (Ryan, supra, at para. 55), how likely is it that it could 
                                                                                                             
the error will invalidate the decision, regardless of whether the standard applied is 
reasonableness simpliciter or patent unreasonableness (see D. K. Lovett, ‘That Curious 
Curial Deference Just Gets Curiouser and Curiouser — Canada (Director of 
Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc.’ (1997), 55 Advocate (B.C.) 541, at p. 545). 
Because the two variants of reasonableness are united at their theoretical source, the 
imperative for the reviewing court to intervene will turn on the conclusion that the 
adjudicator’s decision deviates from what falls within the ambit of the reasonable, not on 
‘fine distinctions’ between the test for patent unreasonableness and reasonableness 
simpliciter (see Flazon, supra, at p. 33). 
Id., at para. 108. 
19 Id., at para. 99. 
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be sustained on ‘any reasonable interpretation of the facts or of the law’ 
(and thus not be patently unreasonable) (National Corn Growers, supra, at 
pp. 1369-70, per Gonthier J.)?20 
Justice LeBel concluded his analysis by calling for administrative law to 
continue its “evolution”. With a concern for coherence, predictability and 
workability in mind, he raised the possibility of a turning back of the 
clock to a time when deference was an “on-off” switch, under which a 
court would either show deference or decide not to show deference to an 
administrative decision.21 He explored this view further outside the 
context of Supreme Court judgments in “Some Properly Deferential 
Thoughts on Deference”.22 A few short years later, he would have the 
opportunity to apply his preferred approach to the next milestone in the 
evolution of the standard of review in Canadian administrative law. 
III. DUNSMUIR AND THE NEW AND IMPROVED  
STANDARD OF REVIEW ANALYSIS 
In arguably the most significant decision for Canadian administrative 
law since the Supreme Court’s 1999 Baker decision, the majority decision in 
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, authored by Bastarache J. and Justice LeBel, 
delivered the very overhaul Justice LeBel had urged in Toronto (City): 
The two types of judicial review, on the merits and on the process, are 
therefore engaged in this case. Our review of the system will therefore 
be comprehensive, which is preferable since a holistic approach is 
needed when dealing with fundamental principles.23 
The majority judgment in Dunsmuir reduced the number of review 
standards in Canadian administrative law from three to two with “patent 
unreasonableness” disappearing from the lexicon. There would now 
simply be a deferential standard, known as reasonableness, and the 
standard of correctness which conveyed less deference.  
The judgment also renamed the methodology to be employed in 
determining the standard of review from the “pragmatic and functional 
analysis” to the “standard of review analysis”. While the test has a new 
name, its content is the same, and involves a consideration of four factors: 
                                                                                                                                   
20 Id., at para. 121. 
21 Id., at para. 134. 
22 (2008) 21 C.J.A.L.P. 1. 
23 Dunsmuir, supra, note 5, at para. 26. 
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(1) the presence or absence of a privative clause; (2) the purpose of the 
tribunal in light of the enabling legislation; (3) the nature of the question at 
issue; and (4) the expertise of the tribunal. Although the Court had insisted 
that all factors be considered in all cases under the earlier approach, 
Justices LeBel and Bastarache clarified that not all factors will need to be 
considered under the standard of review analysis, as a particular factor 
may on its own be determinative of the reasonableness standard.  
Importantly, the judgment envisions recourse to this standard of 
review methodology only where the standard of review has not already 
been established by previous jurisprudence, and where the standard is not 
clear on its face, where for example, “true questions of jurisdiction” is 
involved, or where a question of law that is both of “central importance 
to the legal system as a whole” is at issue. 
Taken together, these changes streamline and simplify the standard 
of review analysis, though there is no suggestion in Dunsmuir that any 
previous standard of review decision would have had a different outcome 
or would not remain good law. 
Dunsmuir was a New Brunswick public servant, dismissed and given 
four and a half months salary in lieu of notice. The Government relied on 
section 20 of the Civil Service Act24 which provided that “[s]ubject to the 
provisions of this Act and any other Act” termination of any employee 
“shall be governed by the ordinary rules of contract”. According to the 
Government, this meant it could dismiss Dunsmuir simply by providing 
him with reasonable notice or salary in lieu thereof. It did not have to 
establish cause or give him a hearing before dismissing him. 
While Dunsmuir was dismissed because he was deemed not suitable 
for the position he was occupying, he grieved the decision, contesting 
both the notice period and whether the dismissal was actually for cause 
(in which case additional procedural rights would be triggered by statute). 
In a preliminary ruling, the adjudicator rejected the Government’s 
challenge and finding that Dunsmuir’s dismissal was related to his work 
performance, ordered that the Government reinstate Dunsmuir as of the 
date of dismissal because it had dismissed him without a hearing. On an 
application for judicial review,25 the motions court judge determined that 
the appropriate standard of review was correctness and set aside the 
adjudicator’s decision on the preliminary motion as incorrect in law.  
                                                                                                                                   
24 S.N.B. 1984, c. C-5.1. 
25 Nouveau-Brunswick (Conseil de gestion) c. Dunsmuir, [2005] N.B.J. No. 327, 2005 
NBQB 270 (N.B.Q.B.). 
154 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 70 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
The Court of Appeal sustained that decision but on the basis that 
unreasonableness was the appropriate standard of review.26  
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the lower courts’ decision.  
A majority of the Court found the standard of review to be reasonableness 
and that the adjudicator’s decision was unreasonable as a matter of law. 
Three of the judges (Deschamps J., Charron and Rothstein JJ. concurring) 
reached the same conclusion on the basis of correctness review.  
Justices LeBel and Bastarache described the reasonableness review 
in the following terms: 
a deferential standard animated by the principle that underlies the 
development of the two previous standards of reasonableness: certain 
questions that come before administrative tribunals do not lend 
themselves to one specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise 
to a number of possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals have a 
margin of appreciation within the range of acceptable and rational 
solutions. A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquiries into 
the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the 
process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, 
reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, 
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But 
it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of 
possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the 
facts and law.27 
For the majority, the decision did not meet this standard because the 
adjudicator inquired into the reasons for the discharge of Dunsmuir, an 
inquiry inconsistent on any reading with the employment contract which 
governed Dunsmuir’s relationship as a non-unionized employee to the 
employer. In short, the adjudicator had treated a matter of private law as 
if it were a matter of public law.  
All nine members of the Court held that those in Dunsmuir’s position 
have no entitlement to procedural fairness as a pre-condition of effective 
dismissal. The procedural fairness aspect of the decision represented an 
overturning of earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence and confirmed that 
fairness issues in the context of public office holders should be 
appropriately addressed through private employment law principles. In 
                                                                                                                                   
26 Nouveau-Brunswick (Conseil de gestion) c. Dunsmuir, [2006] N.B.J. No. 118, 2006 
NBCA 27 (N.B.C.A.). 
27 Dunsmuir, supra, note 5, at para. 47 (S.C.C.). 
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Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19,28 the Court held a public 
law duty of fairness arose when a statutory employee, who served at the 
pleasure of the School Division, was dismissed. That decision, in turn, 
built on Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk (Regional) Police Commissioners,29 
which confirmed fairness duties in the context of public employment. As 
a result, Dunsmuir reversed Knight. 
Justices LeBel and Bastarache’s attempt to cohere the standard 
of review was subject to critique within the decision itself, notably 
by Binnie J., in concurring reasons, who noted that while the majority 
ambitiously seeks to revisit the standard of review system as a whole, 
their framework focuses exclusively on adjudicative tribunals. In one of 
the more memorable lines from any administrative law judgment, Binnie J. 
observed, “... [j]udicial review is an idea that has lately become unduly 
burdened with law office metaphysics.”30  
Justice Binnie questioned whether the Dunsmuir framework could be 
easily applied to discretionary decisions by ministers or “lesser officials” 
working in the “bowels and recesses of government departments”.31 For 
Binnie J., the “nature of the question” is more than one of several factors 
to be considered; rather, it drives any determination of what kinds of 
reasonable outcomes a decision-maker is authorized to make. 
Another critical strand was highlighted by Deschamps J. who, joined 
by Rothstein J. and Charron J., argued for an even simpler and more 
straightforward statutory interpretation approach, and one based in long 
established doctrines of appellate review of trial decisions. Where an 
administrative decision concerns a question of fact or mixed fact and law, 
for Deschamps J., deference should normally follow. Where the decision 
involves a question of law, the analysis as to whether deference is 
warranted should be based on statutory interpretation principles. 
Thus, while Dunsmuir aspires for a comprehensive revision of the 
standard of review doctrine, the central critiques — that it fails to engage 
with complexity on the one hand, and simplicity on the other hand,  
are apparent in the concurring judgments themselves. The tantalizing 
question Dunsmuir raises but arguably fails to resolve is whether 
complexity and simplicity can be embraced under the standard of review 
doctrine. I return to this notion below in the fourth section of this article. 
                                                                                                                                   
28 [1990] S.C.J. No. 26, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Knight”]. 
29 [1978] S.C.J. No. 88, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311 (S.C.C.). 
30 Dunsmuir, supra, note 5, at para. 122 (S.C.C.). 
31 Id., at para. 136. 
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While Justice LeBel took active roles in other areas of Administrative 
Law in the years that followed, applying, refining and defending the 
Dunsmuir framework characterized most of his reasons in subsequent 
cases in the field. 
IV. THE IMAGINATION OF JUSTICE LEBEL’S  
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
While the most significant cases exploring the impact of Dunsmuir 
have been authored by other members of the Court (for example, Binnie J. 
authored the majority reasons in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 
v. Khosa,32 which featured two further concurring sets of reasons and 
dissenting reasons all seeking to interpret Dunsmuir in the context of the 
statutory standard of review set out in the Federal Courts Act),33 Justice 
LeBel has returned to the standard of review analysis in various contexts.  
In Montréal (City) v. Montreal Port Authority,34 Justice LeBel authored 
a unanimous judgment considering statutory discretion exercised by a 
Crown Corporation in relation to a municipal taxation scheme. Justice 
LeBel confirmed that the reasonableness standard is particularly well-
suited to the exercise of discretion where there is more than one possible 
course of action. In this case, he concluded the decision was not 
reasonable as the approach taken by the Crown Corporation accorded 
neither to the statutory framework nor Parliament’s intent. 
In Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney 
General),35 Justices LeBel and Cromwell, writing for the majority, apply 
the standard of review in the context of a human rights tribunal exercising 
its authority to award costs. While acknowledging this is a question of law, 
Justices LeBel and Cromwell view the question as one within the 
Tribunal’s home statute and not one that rises to the exception created in 
Dunsmuir for declining deference where a question of central importance 
for the legal system is at issue. The majority concludes that even viewed 
through the most generous interpretation, the power of the Tribunal to 
redress costs incurred by victims of discrimination cannot extend to legal 
                                                                                                                                   
32 [2009] S.C.J. No. 12, 2009 SCC 12 (S.C.C.). 
33 For an excellent review of the challenges of applying Dunsmuir in subsequent case law, 
see Paul Daly, “The Unfortunate Triumph of Form over Substance in Canadian Administrative Law” 
(2012) 50 Osgoode Hall L.J. 317-57.  
34 [2010] S.C.J. No. 14, 2010 SCC 14 (S.C.C.). 
35 [2011] S.C.J. No. 53, 2011 SCC 53 (S.C.C.). 
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expenses. While this case represents a welcome clarification of the scope 
of “questions central to the legal system”, it also reveals the kinds of new 
metaphysics Binnie J. warned about in Dunsmuir, focusing more on the 
nomenclature to which Dunsmuir has given rise and less on the spectrum 
of deference and its underlying rationales.  
In Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness),36 
Justice LeBel, writing for a unanimous Court, summarized and applied 
the Dunsmuir framework in exactly the kind of discretionary context 
Binnie J. argued Dunsmuir had failed to consider. Agraira involved a 
ministerial decision to deny relief to a Libyan national who had been 
found inadmissible to Canada because of his sustained contact with a 
terrorist organization. The statute provided for ministerial relief of this 
decision, which Agraira sought. In determining the appropriate standard 
of review for the Minister’s decision to deny the discretionary relief 
requested, Justice LeBel set out that a court needs to engage in a two-step 
process: first, the Court must determine whether the standard of review 
has been established satisfactorily in the existing jurisprudence; and 
second, and only if the answer to the first question is “no”, the Court 
must perform a full standard of review analysis.  
Justice LeBel found that in the ministerial context at issue in 
Agraira, the standard of review had been satisfactorily determined in 
past decisions to be reasonableness. The Minister’s interpretation of 
“national interest” in the legislation to include national security concerns 
was found to be reasonable, notwithstanding a recommendation from 
staff in the Ministry that the relief be granted based on the circumstances 
of the case, and in particular the minimal contact between Agraira and 
the terrorist organization.37 Justice LeBel highlighted that it was open to 
the Minister to interpret the “national interest” term in the manner he did 
and that this did not mean other factors set out in a ministry guideline 
were not considered as well. The fact that the Minister’s determination 
differed from his staff’s recommendations could not in itself lead to the 
conclusion that the Minister was acting unreasonably in exercising his 
discretion. While critics were perhaps justified in worrying that the 
collapse of patent unreasonableness and reasonableness simpliciter  
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standards in Dunsmuir might invite greater judicial intervention, Justice 
LeBel’s post-Dunsmuir decisions reflect a robust appreciation of deference, 
particularly in relation to ministerial discretion. Indeed, some have 
argued judicial review where national security is involved (particularly 
post-9/11) has been overly deferential.38 The aspect of Agraira with 
implications more far-reaching than the standard of review, however, 
relates to the place of soft law in the framework of administrative law. 
Dating back at least to the Baker decision, the Court approached the 
existence of ministerial guidelines (which, because they are developed by 
the executive body itself and not promulgated through legislation or 
regulations, cannot be treated as binding) as playing a role in the 
reasonableness analysis. In other words, in Baker, the Court found the 
decision to deport Ms. Baker was inconsistent with the applicable 
guideline which indicated parents would not be separated from their 
children. This inconsistency was treated as one of several indicia of 
unreasonableness in the exercise of ministerial discretion in that context.39 
In Agraira, the issue should not have arisen, as Justice LeBel found that 
the ministerial decision at issue was not inconsistent with the applicable 
guidelines and therefore could not form a basis for concluding the exercise 
of discretion was unreasonable. In a brief section at the end of his reasons, 
however, Justice LeBel indicated (arguably, in obiter) that a publicly  
issued guideline setting out clear procedures to which the decision- 
maker committed to follow could give rise to legitimate expectations.40 As 
confirmed in Baker, legitimate expectations cannot create a fairness 
obligation that does not otherwise exist, but can expand or amplify an 
existing fairness obligation where the affected individual is promised a 
particular procedure or substantive result.41 Justice LeBel’s reference to 
guidelines creating a legitimate expectation in Agraira begs far more 
questions than it resolves. Why would legitimate expectations arise only 
from procedural guidelines and not substantive ones? Does recognizing 
guidelines as giving rise to legitimate expectations mean some guidelines 
(e.g., procedural ones) can be treated as binding? What is the significance in 
this context of a guideline being “publicly” available? Should a guideline 
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39 Baker, supra, note 9, at paras. 72-75. 
40 Agraira, supra, note 36, at para. 101. 
41 Baker, supra, note 9, at para. 26.  
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obligating a decision-maker to follow a particular procedure that is not 
public be more easily disregarded?  
The way in which Agraira might revive the relevance of soft law and 
the relevance of the law of legitimate expectations will have to await 
subsequent application. In an odd way, the way in which Justice LeBel 
raised the legitimate expectation issue in Agraira is reminiscent of his first 
reference to his doubts about the standard of review in Chamberlain — as 
an aside in a case where the reference was not determinative to the outcome 
of the case. Justice LeBel’s analytic authenticity unfolds alongside his 
intellectual curiosity and an overarching vision of accountability through 
administrative law. 
In his final administrative law judgment, in Mission Institution v. 
Khela,42 Justice LeBel considered the argument that “Dunsmuir 
Reasonableness” review cannot apply to a decision of prison authorities 
on a habeas corpus application. Rejecting this premise, Justice LeBel 
reviewed the decision to transfer an inmate to a maximum security 
facility on a standard of reasonableness. Notwithstanding the important 
legal interests at stake, Justice LeBel argued a failure to apply deference 
would lead to courts micro-managing prisons. Ultimately, Justice LeBel 
did not need to apply the unreasonableness standard as he found the 
transfer decision at issue was unlawful on procedural fairness grounds. 
Another dimension of the Khela decision was the determination that 
jurisdiction over habeas corpus applications could be shared between 
federal and provincial courts. While this decision appears to cut against 
the goal of coherence (shared jurisdiction can lead to re-litigation and 
inconsistent decisions), it advances the sometimes competing goal of 
access to justice by ensuring multiple avenues of redress.43 In this sense, 
Khela represents a last affirmation that coherence is necessary in the 
development of administrative law, but not always sufficient. 
There is a clear arc to Justice LeBel’s design of the standard of 
review doctrine, from his early cri de coeur calling for greater coherence 
in Chamberlain and Toronto (City), through to his comprehensive and 
principled overhaul of the standard of review analysis in Dunsmuir, and 
subsequent refinements and applications in his last judgments. While it is 
too early to offer definitive conclusions on how enduring the Dunsmuir 
analysis will turn out to be, it is clear that by the time of his retirement, 
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Justice LeBel had emerged as a leading architect of the Court’s approach 
to administrative law. That approach is rooted in a responsive and clearly 
articulated analytic framework. 
In a paper written for a conference in honour of retiring Justice 
Iacobucci, Colleen Flood and I mapped out what we argued was a way to 
marry the desire for simplicity in the standard of review analysis with an 
embrace of diversity and the complexity to which it inevitably gives rise. 
We looked for inspiration to the other grand doctrine of Canadian 
administrative law — procedural fairness. While the standard of review 
has been mired in the aforementioned metaphysics, the duty of fairness 
has come to be seen as a spectrum of varying obligations which may be 
adapted to any setting involving an administrative decision-maker. Baker 
may not have stood the test of time as a decision synthesizing the 
standard of review for exercises of administrative discretion, but its 
synthesis of the threshold, degree and content of fairness remains 
the well-spring for the duty of fairness 15 years later. Both the fairness 
and standard of review doctrines balance the primacy of legislative 
intent with non-exemptible minimum standards of legality. Why then 
have they diverged so strikingly within the same context of Canadian 
administrative law? 
One of the reasons for the success of the Court’s fairness 
jurisprudence is its aversion to imposing fixed categories on the myriad 
points along the spectrum of fairness where particular decisions (in light 
of the decision-maker, the statutory scheme, the expectation of those 
affected by the decision, and the impact of the decision on their lives) 
might fall. While the Court has spoken generally of minimal, medium 
and high degrees of fairness, there has been no attempt to define and 
distinguish these terms from one another. Rather, they are simply 
directional beacons as to how onerous fairness obligations are to be 
depending on the context. This demonstrates the potential of the judicial 
role when it builds on the lived realities of administrative justice, rather 
than trying to fit the roundness of that lived experience into the 
squareness of juridical categories.  
While an approach contemplating multiple points of deference along 
a principled spectrum stood in stark contrast to Iacobucci J.’s categorical 
approach to the standard of review, I would argue it represents the 
fulfilment of Justice LeBel’s search for coherence in the complexity of 
the administrative state. 
I am not suggesting the standard of review analysis need look 
identical to the fairness analysis. Rather, I am suggesting deference is 
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(and ought to be) a far more variable concept than it has been currently 
envisioned. It is more than the distinction between correctness review 
and reasonableness review.  
What would such an approach look like? An example may be found 
in New Zealand, and the decision of its High Court in Wolf v. Minister of 
Immigration.44 Mirroring some aspects of Baker, that case involved a 
review of a deportation decision which would have the effect of 
separating a father from his two children. Justice Wild found the 
significance of the decision to the affected father should be considered in 
determining the standard of reasonableness to be applied by the 
reviewing court in the case. Justice Wild summarized the approach to be 
followed in the following passage: 
Whether a reviewing Court considers a decision reasonable and 
therefore lawful, or unreasonable and therefore unlawful and invalid, 
depends on the nature of the decision: upon who made it; by what 
process; what the decision involves (ie its subject matter and the level 
of policy content in it) and the importance of the decision to those 
affected by it, in terms of its potential impact upon, or consequences 
for, them.45  
While no Canadian court has yet adapted the fairness analysis to inform 
the standard of review in this fashion, there have been glimmers that the 
Canadian Supreme Court is open to exploring points of intersection 
between the fairness analysis and the Dunsmuir analysis. In Newfoundland 
and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury 
Board),46 Abella J., wrote for a unanimous Court about the relationship 
between the Dunsmuir analysis and the quality of reasons provided by a 
tribunal (which had been viewed primarily through the lens of the 
variable duty of fairness post-Baker): 
This, I think, is the context for understanding what the Court meant in 
Dunsmuir when it called for ‘justification, transparency and intelligibility’. 
To me, it represents a respectful appreciation that a wide range of 
specialized decision-makers routinely render decisions in their respective 
spheres of expertise, using concepts and language often unique to  
their areas and rendering decisions that are often counter-intuitive to a 
generalist .... 
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Read as a whole, I do not see Dunsmuir as standing for the proposition 
that the ‘adequacy’ of reasons is a stand-alone basis for quashing a 
decision, or as advocating that a reviewing court undertake two discrete 
analyses — one for the reasons and a separate one for the result (Donald 
J. M. Brown and John M. Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action in Canada (loose-leaf), at §§12:5330 and 12:5510). It is a more 
organic exercise — the reasons must be read together with the outcome 
and serve the purpose of showing whether the result falls within a  
range of possible outcomes. This, it seems to me, is what the Court was 
saying in Dunsmuir when it told reviewing courts to look at ‘the qualities 
that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of 
articulating the reasons and to outcomes’ (para. 47). 
... if the reasons allow the reviewing court to understand why the tribunal 
made its decision and permit it to determine whether the conclusion is 
within the range of acceptable outcomes, the Dunsmuir criteria are met.47 
Just as the duty to provide reasons will vary according to the degree of 
fairness appropriate to particular decision-making contexts, so the 
scrutiny of those reasons may vary according to the degree of deference 
appropriate to particular decision-making contexts. Deference, in other 
words, is a concept that need not be an on-off switch. Just as there may 
be varying degrees of intensity in an analysis of fairness (where one 
setting might require full disclosure and an oral hearing, another may be 
fair if there is simply notice and an opportunity to be heard in writing), 
so deference may be adapted to various circumstances. This does not put 
judges in the position of having to divine the distinction between two 
levels of unreasonableness, as had been the undoing of the pre-Dunsmuir 
pragmatic and functional era, but it does mean that a minister making a 
discretionary policy decision may be entitled to more deference than that 
same minister making a discretionary decision engaging legal rights. 
Deference may well be justified in both cases, but more deference ought 
to attach to the policy determination.  
While Justice LeBel himself may not agree with this approach, it is 
one very much inspired by his call for coherence in a world of decision-
makers affecting assembly lines, cops and cows. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
While Justice LeBel largely (though not fully) delivered on his 
ambitious goal of coherence in the categorical approach to the standard 
of review, the approach itself can only take root if it resonates with the 
lived realities of administrative decision-making. Justice LeBel rightly 
characterized the rule of law and democratic commitments as the twin 
pillars of the standard of review (and, I would add, of administrative law 
more broadly). The project I believe he has left for the next generation of 
thought leaders is to balance these in a way that does justice both to the 
enduring and the evolving context of administrative law.48   
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